



Other tests performed as part of the U.S. offensive biological weapons program include:

*In San Francisco, a U.S. Navy ship equipped with spray devices operated by Fort Detrick personnel sprayed *Serratia marcescens*, a non-pathogenic microorganism that is easily detected, while the ship plied the San Francisco Bay. It spread more than 30 miles to monitoring stations.*

A jet aircraft equipped with spray devices flew a course near Victoria, Texas, and the harmless particles were monitored in the Florida Keys.

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Circuits of the Plague

The currency may be different within each of the power vectors able to capitalize on the threat of germ warfare, but payday has arrived, and the best part is that claiming a reward only requires the appearance of productivity. Votes for politicians, viewers and readers for the media, research funds for Big Science and Medicine, a vastly expanding budget for the military, and perhaps most importantly, the consolidation of power for the dominant political party are all on the table, and the various institutions able to gain from these rewards are already counting their riches. Any self-respecting capitalist institution should be able to exploit this false economy of threat, but it must follow one simple rule: It must agree to expanded militarization of its resources and its relations to its particular form of production. This is not to say that all civil functions must be eliminated; it

is only to say that more tribute (perhaps more than ever before) must be paid to the sacrificial economy of the military. Any enterprise that accomplishes this task is welcome, and the tribute may be paid in symbolic or material form. Manufacturing or maintaining the public perception of imminent biological threat or militarizing civil process are both acceptable forms of payment that double as a means to profit for the broad variety of confederates.

While the circuit of exchange is grander than it has ever been, this model of opportunity in relation to biothreat dates back to the 1930s. At that time, the idea of maximizing profit and consolidating power through the matrix of biocatastrophe was launched. One might be tempted to think this was an idea that had to originate in the United States where the arms industry was at full tilt following the boom of sales to Europe during World War I, but this is not the case. The United States military, at this point in time, did not see much value in germ warfare, nor had it yet assumed the policy of weaponizing any material or process that could be weaponized. Instead, this idea found a responsive state in imperial Japan, and Ishii Shiro, a major in the Army Medical Corps, was the mastermind who developed it.

Ishii's inspiration was threefold in nature: an encephalitis outbreak in Shikoku, the 1925 Geneva protocol, and his own practical work for the Japanese military. In 1930, Ishii was working at the Tokyo Army Medical College. During this time, he developed a ceramic filter that could eliminate bacteria and viruses from water. Given the imperial ambitions of Japan, the military situated itself in many tropical territories where waterborne disease was an extreme hazard. His invention was

seen as a miracle breakthrough. The filter was adopted by both the Army and Navy, and Ishii was handsomely rewarded with royalties from the use of the device. For this work, he not only received a substantial fortune, he also gained legitimacy in the eyes of the state. When it came to policy regarding disease, Ishii was a man to consult and listen to. He clearly knew that aiding the military in defending against germs was a fast track to wealth and power, and he had no trouble making the jump to exploring the use of germs for military advantage as a means to achieve the same results.

His first consideration of germs as a weapon probably dates back to his experience of the encephalitis outbreak on the island of Shikoku in 1924. The disease and how it spread (via mosquitoes) was not known until much later, and while Ishii could not do anything to stem the rate of infection, he did get to see just how devastating a contagion like this could be. In all, 3,500 people died of severe brain inflammation. Considering the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (Japan did not sign until 1970), Ishii reasoned that elimination of the use of “bacteriological methods of warfare” would only be done if the various militaries of the world considered dangerous strains of bacteria to be effective, useful weapons. These thoughts and experiences led him to give a series of lectures in 1931 on the advantages of weaponizing germs. As a fully legitimized, well connected, medical microbiologist, Ishii commanded the authority to make his new scheme a reality. After all, no one doubted that germs were effective killers that had brought many an army to the point of ruin. For example, the destruction of Justinian’s seemingly undefeatable army during the first Black Death in Europe would make any military mind at least consider the idea. Ishii was also quite a showman, and he understood the value

of a good performance even if the facts of the matter had to be bent a little. Ishii told the Imperial Command that the Russians were using germ warfare in Manchuria and the Chinese were poisoning wells with cholera. None of these claims was ever substantiated, and in all probability they were not true, but it did not matter. The Japanese army was fully convinced, and in 1932 awarded Ishii the resources he needed. This included a research lab at the Army Medical College in Tokyo, a bacterial production facility in Harbin, China, and a test site close to the facility in Beiyinhe.

By 1940, now Major-General Ishii was at the peak of his power. His facility at Ping Fan was a modern marvel in regard to germ warfare. It was called the Anti-Epidemic Water Supply and Purification Bureau. Within the 150 buildings on the site there were labs, autopsy rooms, a bombing test site, and a bacteria culture plant. When running at full speed, this plant could produce a monthly yield of 300 kgs of plague organisms, 500 kgs of anthrax spores, or 1000 kgs of cholera. Ishii had 3,000 workers under his command, and the site provided adequate housing, an independent power plant, and a farm to help them along. He also offered recreational facilities for the workers, including a library, a 1000-seat theater, restaurants, an athletic field, a swimming pool, and even a brothel.

Ishii had carved a mini empire for himself by selling his idea of germ warfare. However, in spite of these grand resources, his program was fundamentally useless. Nothing it produced was ever successfully used in a military campaign. A method to successfully deploy his weapons was never devised. His few field tests were either inconclusive, or killed as many Japanese troops as they did Russians or Chinese. (Whether Ishii's weapons

caused plague and cholera in Northern Manchuria is difficult to know, because these diseases were already active in the region and could have spread simply as a byproduct of army life.) He never got even the symbolic benefits of the germ threat since the program was kept secret and was not discovered by the allies until 1944. By 1942, Ishii's program was doing little more than eating away at Japan's dwindling resources, although he did continue to produce a lot of flash (the Uji bomb for example) and hype. Unfortunately, the useless nature of Ishii's program was not its legacy, rather it is the flash that lives on. From a present day perspective, Ishii's brilliance was not his idea for germ warfare, but his recognition of the opportunity to create wealth and power for himself by capitalizing on the fear of germs and their destructive power.

Opportunity for the military state is presenting itself again. The clear and obvious place is in the vast expansion of military budgets in general and of germ warfare programs in particular. The armed forces of the United States may once again gorge themselves on a never-ending supply of resources. They may pursue any fancy no matter how demented, useless, or impossible it may be. These obese vampires can bleed the public dry as long as "security" remains the priority issue and as long as the hyperreality of threat can sustain itself in the imagination of the grand majority of citizens. However, more is at stake than just funds. The military state now sees the opportunity to expand its domain over the civil sector—centering itself as the most important consideration in any economic or political process. The agencies that enable movement, such as the government, the media, science, and medicine are also targets for increased endo-colonization by the military; however, their complicity will earn them a share of the profits of threat.

The Security Industry

Anyone who has visited an airport recently has not only witnessed, but has experienced the spectacle and reality of security intensification—not that it is so much more efficient than it used to be. Other than more ID checks, spiffier uniforms for the security agents, the x-raying of shoes, and the prohibition of visitors at the departure gates, it's basically the same as it always was. Most activities are only there to create the appearance of a secure space, to make travelers less anxious, and to show their tax dollars are at work making everyone a little safer. Actually, this spectacle is a huge waste of taxpayer dollars; passengers were just as safe with the old system. All that really needed to be modified was to prohibit box cutters and related items on the plane and to secure the pilot's cabin door. Surely the former airport employees could have coped with these small adjustments. But there are more interesting proposals on the table than the immediately visible make-work initiative for the feds: The real question seems to be, "How do we make the transportation industry more like the security industry?" After all, the environment is perfect. Visibility is great, people are used to a strict authoritarian environment, and there is relative assurance as to who each individual is. This is the kind of situation that makes police work easy. The problem is that the airline industry is not a police force. However, this problem is being solved through synergistic application. For example, why can't a database of those with outstanding warrants be linked to passenger databases? Such a practice would insure safer flights *and* get criminals off the street. Or, why can't the Homeland Security terrorist watch list be linked to passenger databases? Seemingly a good idea, except for the fact that Homeland Security is very generous in who it places on the list

(even your humble authors are on the list). The generality, not the particularity, is really what is so undesirable. The prevailing logic is that all civilian industry should have dual function—its service or manufacturing function and its security function. Not only that, all travelers should now be police. In a stunning reversal of policy, travelers are encouraged not to cooperate with a hijacker and to fight back. After all, the hijacker is going to kill all the passengers anyway. Is it any wonder that xenophobic vigilante activity is breaking out all over the United States and particularly on the border with Mexico? The policing model we now find in airports and the premises that underlie it are cornerstones in the foundation of a police state.

On July 7, 2005, the security state was given another gift with the bombings of the subway and a bus in London. The question they brought forth was, "Why should the airport model not be expanded to all forms of public transportation?" The subways of most major cities became immediate military zones complete with police gangs conducting "random" searches. The subway offers the state the benefit of reaching far more people than the airports and apparently with little resistance thus far. CAE cannot demonstrate that the searches are not random, or that they are an abuse of power (there have been no studies yet). However, we can impressionistically say, based on our own experience on a watch list, there are two scenarios that launch a search. One, a person is on a watch list, or two, a person is profiled. From our long experience with secondary customs, CAE would like to reassure right wing bigots everywhere that a policy of profiling is what is being enacted even if it is not the official policy. Every time we have been in secondary customs, we have been there solely with Arab peoples. At the subway, this base can expand as police use their new mandate to pro-

tect to profile for drugs and guns as well as terrorists. What demographic would the police think has drugs and guns?

The airport/subway militarization is revealing in other ways as well. The United States is beginning to pay more attention to police methodology by following the example of its ally the United Kingdom. While the United States has always had an approach to policing based in presence (the cop on the beat) and showing their colors whenever and wherever possible, the British have preferred a virtual style of policing. Let the cameras do the walking. Everything from robbery to speeding tickets is primarily policed via cameras. Now for the United States, the course of action is clear: Use it all. People are already used to being on camera all the time and no longer think about it as an invasion of privacy. Like taxes, surveillance is just a fact of life. The possibility that U.S. systems will become as advanced as those used in London's financial district (where everyone is scanned upon entering and a criminal data base is consulted to see if any match occurs) appears increasingly likely given the latest trends.

Bentham's panopticon, found in so much prison architecture, is now little more than alibi for the illusion that whatever may pass for public or private space is not a panoptic architecture. The panopticon is the Disneyland of post 9/11 society—a place to see incarceration as a display, whether it is Joliet or Camp X-Ray that is being viewed and virtualized. Indeed, one of the security state's greatest achievements is its new line of prisons. The national prison system becomes a mere byproduct of modern capitalism and of the nostalgia for slavery. The new prisons, in all their glorious absence, offer the security state more than just a means of prison industry expansion—they of-

fer new types of authoritarian power. Most are quite apparent, and CAE won't belabor them. The clearest lesson from Gitmo is that anyone can be held without legal consultation or due process. Abu Ghraib has shown the world the latest in torture techniques. And then, there are the secret prisons. What happens to all the enemy prisoners that the news tells the American public about each day? They just disappear. A policy of secrecy and darkness exists, a true favorite of the United States in its overseas activities.

Here is where surveillance gets interesting. While most critics concerned with surveillance focus on capital's peeking and processing capabilities in relation to the fate of an increasingly illuminated global citizenry, they too often forget about the territories and populations that are off the panoptic grid. The United States does its part well in dispensing deillumination privileges—plenty of cells in the world panopticon have a legitimized lights out. The power of darkness is not just a characteristic of the central watch tower, but occurs in all the cells of those who are the trustees of capital. For example, information on the treatment of the Kurds (both civilian/refugees and insurgents) by the Turkish military is rather scarce and must be actively searched for. When Iraq ferociously attacked the Kurds with a variety of weapons (including chemical ones), that was bad behavior but tolerable, because Hussein was still an ally in the initiative to undermine Iran. During the Gulf War, however, the atrocities against the Kurds were intolerable, and the invisible Kurds lost in darkness were returned to the light and protected in Northern Iraq. But not in Turkey: That situation is still in blackout conditions, and the United States is still willing to supply whatever arms are needed to keep the blood flowing. The same privileges of deillumination are granted to (just to name

a few) Indonesia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and until recently even the Taliban. These regimes seem to be able to make whatever trouble they want in their darkened cells, as long as they do not act contrary to the interests of the watchers.

Another interrelated place in the cultural terrain is the internal attack on dissenting voices within the U.S. citizenry, or even worse, in order to create an internal enemy, on those whose only “crime” is being of the Islamic faith. The Department of Justice has realized that it can expand its power base by finding ways to classify citizens as enemy combatants. The most horrific case is still that of the Lackawana Six, which according to President Bush represented a successful busting of a “sleeping cell.” Prior to 9/11, six Yemeni teens went to Afghanistan to study the Koran. While there, they found themselves at an al Qaeda training camp, which they left as quickly as they could. They returned to the United States and resumed their usual routines. After 9/11, the FBI discovered they had attended this camp and saw that as an excuse to raid the entire Yemeni community—kicking in doors and forcing innocent people out of their homes. The six boys who went to Afghanistan were all arrested. The boys were told by the Justice Department that if they did not plead guilty to material support of terrorism, they would be reclassified as enemy combatants and shipped off to Guantanamo. Having few resources at their disposal, the boys were intimidated into taking the deal. The prosecuting attorney, William Hochul (who is also prosecuting your humble authors), has since admitted that he had no evidence that these boys were doing anything other than living a lawful existence.

Clearly, the security state is spreading like a virus throughout the United States and, unfortunately, with the blessings of

those who would sacrifice their own autonomy and their own interests for a feeling of security. If this is a virus of everyday life, one can only imagine the relation of the security state to the production of knowledge that has economic and military application. The life sciences are being militarized through the use of the carrot and the stick. Oddly enough, one division of the life sciences that was nearly in the grave in terms of the generation of breakthrough knowledge, microbiology, is back from the brink. Not because it will generate anything new and amazing, but because the government and military need to know about germs in general and how the military could use them in particular. The money is flowing, but, with government money, there is always a catch. The investment must be secure. For businesses, this is not a problem as the two have a common interest in keeping what they know private and secure and in that they share an authoritarian micro-culture. For universities, the problem is unmanageable, since the university is charged with producing public, not private, knowledge. Its mandate is to contribute to the cultural commons for the educational good of all. Unfortunately, the cultural commons as a territory of knowledge production is a high priority target for the security state. Knowledge is not for free thinking, but for the instrumental task of advancing the interests of the investing classes. From the perspective of the security state, all knowledge having to do with profit or violence should be privatized and distributed on a need-to-know basis.

The means by which movement is made toward this goal varies. For universities with little money, the offer of funding is simply an easy bribe. For those universities with excess cash resources, the promise of a flagship project is necessary. The real bribe here is not money and equipment, but prestige. This type of bribery

as a form of knowledge control is very broad-based. Within the life sciences, the usual suspects of genetics, molecular biology, and microbiology are not the only ones in on the germ warfare big bonanza: Botany, zoology, and environmental biology can also get a piece of the pie. (The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has recommended that as many of the sciences as possible be brought into the germ warfare family. Most of these nontraditional members are coming in through the Biowatch program and are involved in creating sentinel organisms). Once inside, the security state equips all doors with locks to keep out any trespassers. Any type of amateur, any colleague not on the project, any interdisciplinarian, or any student must be kept outside, because they have no justification for access to this knowledge and are a potential security threat. Those locked inside are subject to security review, their protocols are policed, and they must be silent about their work—a very bad situation for pedagogues, but not much better for the janitors. Here lies the second cornerstone of the police state—privatize and lock down knowledge. Given the current intensity of these “security” tendencies, this nation can only be politically classified as proto-fascist.

Politics and Plague

One unfortunate irony floating through U.S. politics is that when the public hears White House spokespeople on the evening agitprop report say, “We are winning the war on terrorism,” they are hearing the truth, but misinterpreting it. The two common interpretive positions are the White House is telling us the plain truth, or the White House is lying and the United States and its allies are actually losing; i.e., the insurgency is

growing in Iraq, and terrorism is expanding in Europe with no end in site. The problem is that both interpretations of the statement are wrong. The confusion stems from the use of the word “we.” Many citizens are deluded into thinking the “we” includes them. It does not. In this case of meta-irony, or irony squared, “we” means authoritarian power vectors (APVs), and “winning” means coming to power. While the terrorists are in conflict with the APVs, the APVs find the situation to be in harmony with their interests.

The goal of terrorism is not military victory, but a negotiated settlement. To meet this objective, acts of terror are perpetrated with the goal of getting an extreme reaction out of the government attacked. If these attacks are sustained over a long period of time (decades if necessary) and the government under attack continues to take a reactionary position,* an authoritarian state will emerge that will exploit and torment the citizenry in the same manner as it does the culture represented by the terrorists (or as they consider themselves, freedom fighters). Once the citizens are so enlightened, as well as being tired of the ongoing attacks, they will pressure for negotiations from the inside. In this case, fundamentalist extremists carrying out the recent terrorist attacks world-wide believe that the West is a colonial army occupying their land, attempting to dictate cultural policy

* Spain, a far more committed democracy than the United States, refused to take a reactionary position in regard to terrorism or to move into a state of security panic. The experience and maturity gained through the struggle with Basque separatists is revealed in its investigative and defense initiatives that reflect an understanding of terrorist strategy, as well as terrorism’s relation to duration.

and stealing or exploiting economic resources. This same set of conditions (only in endocolonial form) is what they hope to bring to the West, believing that the citizens of a democracy will never tolerate such a situation and would rather see their diplomats negotiate for an honorable peace. In the majority of cases in the West, this assumption is appropriate, but in the case of the United States, it could not be more inappropriate. The conditions that the extremists want to produce are the very conditions desired by APVs. Rather than fighting the United States, the terrorists are actually contributing to the dominant general political goal—a full-scale authoritarian government. They are sadly mistaken if they think they will get anywhere with this strategy, since the United States will only too gladly intensify its endo-authoritarian tendencies in the belief that once the citizens wake up to what they have lost, it will be too late—authoritarian structure will have solidified.

The problem U.S. proto-fascists have is that the terrorists are not fulfilling their end of the bargain. Since 9/11, there has not been any activity in the United States. Because the terrorists are so slow (getting a powerful attack going about every ten years), the current right wing government itself has to terrorize the citizens. One of its favorite topics to fall back on is bioterrorism. What would happen if we were attacked? In chapter one, CAE showed that a large scale attack is nearly an impossibility. The staged drills in major cities, the stockpiling of vaccines, the emotional calls for increased attention to this hazard, and most importantly the announcement by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff that bioterrorism is on the top priority list of major concerns—all are performed to keep the fear level high. The key here is for politicians to look like they are doing something that responds to the concerns of

a given constituency. If the constituents are concerned about bioterrorism and nothing is happening, it is incumbent upon their representatives to make something happen in order to simulate doing something about the crisis that doesn't exist. The spectacle is as significant as the real. Body invasion and nuclear holocaust are the best provocateurs as weapons of mass distraction, and they are being called upon with ritualistic regularity. Luckily for the government, the media has never met a weapon of mass distraction that it did not like.

News Media, Threat, and Profit

On the one hand, the media has long had a conflicted relationship with state and corporate power. Even the most respected particular forms such as journalism and news reporting have had to pay tribute to their news providers (the state and military). These payments tend to conflict, sometimes bitterly, with the more idealistic goals of neutral observation and objective fact-based reporting. On the other hand, a conflict with its audience also exists. The viewers have to want to watch or read the reportage and this constitutes another pressure that must be addressed. Caught between these two pressures, the media industry in general and the news media in particular are in the unfortunate practical position of having to negotiate this problem of truth-bending demands while attempting to best approximate their ideals. In order to optimize this situation, the news media prefer it when the two forces can be made complementary to one another; i.e., when what the state wants to tell the media audience is what the audience wants to hear. One of the most dependable narratives used to create this dovetail effect is that of crisis. The crisis narrative generates a fear that something

bad could happen to the individual or to valued resources that individuals want. In turn, a desire emerges for preparedness (or knowledge of preparation by a protectorate) that will return the general audience to a state of security. Information about how to regain a state of relative calm comes from the state, relayed by the media. In this scenario, everyone gets what s/he wants. The state gets its position communicatively exchanged as a necessary legitimized fact; the media attracts motivated viewers, satisfying advertisers and investors and thus increasing its profit potential; and the audience gets information about the crisis, along with a “reassuring” promise that the crisis is being engaged and neutralized.

In spite of this trajectory of cooperation, the news media have the problem of maintaining the journalistic integrity that enables the public perception of legitimacy in regard to the reporting of facts. In addition, the perception of crisis must be maintained, and facts often get in the way of this narrative promotion. To evade the reporting of facts that could disrupt the representation desired by the state, as much time as possible is spent on nonfactual discussion. Experts, consultants, and editorialists are enlisted to wildly speculate on the apocalyptic outcomes of a given crisis scenario and to talk about what could be done to circumvent these outcomes. Such discussions reinforce the appearance of the crisis as immediate and undeniable, while at the same time creating both a discourse of preparedness that can function in the interest of the state and military and a representational environment in which it appears that the news media are doing their job.

A second strategy is to retreat into areas of representation so vague they cannot be contested by an appeal to facticity. There is

no better example of this strategy than the creation of the “threat index” by the U.S. Government’s Department of Homeland Security. This “threat index” is religiously reported by the news media whenever the government gives the call. The threat index allegedly lets the public know the level of imminence regarding a near future terrorist attack. The index does not tell where, when, or how such an event will occur, it merely says that an attack is less probable or more probable than in the near past. Moreover, its foundation is supposedly “credible evidence” gathered by an unknown—presumably government—agency and legitimized by an unknown source. Further, the indicators of what constitutes “credible evidence” have never been disclosed. Speculation has it that it can be anything from a “credible informant” to increased enemy chatter on the airwaves. All that is actually known is that Homeland Security says a real threat exists. Although the index is perpetually wrong as nothing has happened since its first appearance, it continues to be exchanged as an empty sign of threat—there to help the public stay prepared.

In situations such as this, biowarfare comes to be a great ally of those who benefit by the perpetuation of the representation of crisis. Mass body invasion by germs is always one of the potential threats to which the index may refer. This fearsome possibility can then be reinforced by the news fictionalists that are presented to the public as expert consultants. As if this is not enough, mass spectacles of under-preparedness are simulated in cities around the United States in conjunction with the federal government. Coverage of these media circuses circulates on the airwaves and in newspapers nation-wide. Images of the fallen and of people in spooky decontamination suits spraying disinfectant create a greater spectacle of fear, which in turn engenders more discus-

sion of apocalyptic scenarios. (We will return to this issue in the chapter on the spectacle of public health.) In all this media hype, never is the public reminded that an incident of germ warfare has happened only once, or that the origin of the germs used for that attack was the U.S. military. Rather, the public is only left with the fear that attacks could occur, along with a profound sense of disempowerment that reinforces the deferment of protective function to the state.

Should the news media refuse to see their interests as aligning with government policy and its need for the perpetuation of crisis, the state has punishment mechanisms at its disposal. Both the government (primarily the office of the president) and the military can deny access to media functions such as press conferences. One would think that this punishment would be a minor inconvenience, but here the state can exploit the news media's own warped priorities. The value of the media getting a story first has come to hold greater significance than quality reporting. Without access to presidential press functions, the individual news media companies fear they will lose viewers due to lack of speed; they will fall behind the discussion curve and fall into irrelevance for the viewer. As with so many institutions in the time of postmodernity, speed is a greater generator of profit than quality or integrity. What makes this situation even more absurd is that the differential between getting the scoop first and getting left in the dust is only a matter of minutes—and often even less than that. It's quite possible that getting the scoop first is a value that is only perceived by the press itself. If the separation between networks on getting a story is only a matter of minutes, who besides the most dedicated of channel surfers with multiple televisions would ever know the difference?

What the public gets in the end is a monstrous propaganda machine that functions as a finger on the thrusting fist of authority. The news media is one of many institutions that aids in the internalization of the hyperreality of crisis in general and the crisis in biointegrity in particular. A mode of consciousness is created in which the public comes to desire its state of fear and even feel protective of it. The delivery of contrary information—and thereby the denial of the immediacy of crisis—is often met with angry skepticism as if something of value is being taken from individuals. Leaving the security of hyperreality and the comfort of panic (both having established themselves in bodies, in desire, and in performativity) becomes a suicidal or murderous possibility, prompting a public demand for the consolidation and perpetuation of state violence.

Time to Get Paid

The APVs that benefit from the general situation of terror are making maximum gains. They are extracting more profit and consolidating more power than was probably ever expected. But the loss is not only limited to a redistribution of wealth and power in favor of the already abundantly wealthy and powerful; it goes on to extract life from those within the least powerful demographics. In terms of public policy regarding public health and global health, as we shall see in later chapters, the cost is a literal holocaust, as millions die worldwide every year of AIDS, malaria, cholera, tuberculosis, influenza, and dysentery. As people consume the hyperreality of bioterrorism, they miss the true crisis right in front of their eyes.